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1 Introduction
National and regional governments everywhere compete over mobile capital by devoting con-
siderable resources to investment promotion. Measures ranging from advertising campaigns
and information dissemination all the way to subsidies and tax breaks are designed to attract
new firms and investment.
Such policies may well be efficient from the viewpoint of individual governments if new
firms generate positive local externalities. What can be efficient for individual governments,
however, could be inefficient for the aggregate (national or world) economy. If governments
compete over mobile productive resources which exist in a fixed overall amount, that com-
petition adds nothing to aggregate output. Governments then engage in a zero-sum or even
negative-sum game. Conversely, that same competition will represent a positive-sum game if
it increases aggregate output, either by stimulating economic activity that would otherwise
not exist or by attracting productive resources from outside the territory considered.
In this paper, we point out a new way of discriminating empirically among competing
models of investment location, exploiting the difference between conditional logit and Poisson
estimation. We show how panel data can help us identify the degree of rivalness of local
investment promotion policies through a parameter in a nested-logit model. We take this
methodology to data for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States, using
state-level statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1977 to 2006 and exploiting
policy variation measured through the user cost of capital. Our results suggests that state-level
competition for FDI is largely zero-sum: while tax incentives have a significant influence on
the distribution of investment across states, the total amount of investment is not significantly
affected by state corporate tax policies.
The empirical literature on FDI location has so far largely overlooked this simple but
essential distinction. The emphasis has predominantly been on quantifying the importance
of manifold determinants of investment location - an important and challenging identification
task in itself. The conventional estimation approach has been to rely on McFadden’s (1974)
conditional logit model, which offers a formally rigorous way to derive an estimable empirical
model from the objective function of a representative location-seeking firm. A similarly pop-
ular empirical approach has been to use Poisson count estimation. It has been demonstrated
by Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2003) that, with purely location-specific locational
determinants or with determinants that are specific to locations and to groups of firms, the
two estimators return identical parameter estimates. In that sense, the two estimators are
equivalent.
In earlier work (Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart, 2011), we have shown that the identical co-
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efficient estimates resulting from the two estimation strategies in fact have fundamentally
different economic implications. The implicit premise of the conditional logit model is that
the aggregate amount of investment is fixed and that intergovernmental competition affects
only the distribution of this investment across locations. In the Poisson model, however,
the aggregate amount of investment is a function of locational determinants, such that an
additional unit of capital attracted to one jurisdiction has no impact on investment in the
remaining jurisdictions and thus raises the aggregate stock of capital by one unit. We showed
how intermediate cases between these two extremes can be represented by a nested logit model
featuring a generic “outside option”. Here, we use the fact that the nested-logit elasticities
are linear combinations of the two polar cases described by the conditional logit and Poisson
models. Specifically, we estimate a “rivalness parameter” that fully describes the extent to
which competition for investment deviates from the Poisson-benchmark of purely non-rival
policies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of existing research. In
Section 3, we develop a novel empirical approach for estimating the interregional rivalness of
economic resources. This approach is applied to data on inward FDI across U.S. states in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
The conditional logit model has first been applied to the estimation of the determinants of
firm-level investment location choices by Carlton (1983), and the Poisson count model was
first used in this context by Papke (1991).1 Guimaraes et al. (2003) then showed that the two
approaches yield identical estimates for models that do not feature firm-specific regressors.
While their equivalence result is correct and useful in terms of estimation, we point out in
Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011) that the two models imply different economic interpreta-
tions.
The Guimaraes et al. (2003) equivalence result has become a popular motivation for
using Poisson estimation of equations that are derived from conditional logit models. The
original area of application, firms’ location choices, remains central: Arzaghi and Henderson
(2008) have used the Poisson estimator in a study of the location of advertising agencies in
Manhattan; Davis and Henderson (2008) used it to identify the determinants of headquarter
location across US counties; and Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2011) used it to estimate
1Prominent subsequent applications of the conditional logit model include Bartik (1985), Head, Ries and
Swenson (1995, 1999), Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000), Figueiredo, Guimaraes and Woodward
(2002), Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007), and Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009). Prominent subsequent
applications of the Poisson model include Becker and Henderson (2000), List (2001), Guimaraes, Figueiredo
and Woodward (2004), and Holl (2004).
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the locational determinants of firm entry in England. We have invoked the equivalence result
in a study of the interplay of industry-level differences in agglomeration intensities and regional
differences in tax rates as determinants of firm births in Switzerland (Bru¨lhart, Jametti and
Schmidheiny, 2011). Jofre-Monseny and Sole´-Olle´ (2010) provide a related analysis, based on
data for Catalonia and also using the equivalence of the Poisson with the conditional logit.
The equivalence of conditional logit and Poisson estimation is proving useful also in other
areas of investigation. For instance, Coeurdacier, De Santis and Aviat (2009) have taken it
as the basis for Poisson estimation of a model of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.2
Empirical research on competition over mobile capital has mainly focused on the elasticity
of firm location (or employment, output or value added) in a particular region with respect
to that region’s own policy, with corporate taxes being the policy instrument that has been
afforded greatest attention. This literature generally confirms that, other things equal, mobile
firms seek out low-tax locations.3
The aggregate implications of uncoordinated policies aimed at attracting mobile invest-
ment, however, have remained comparatively underresearched. To the best of our knowledge,
all existing empirical studies of this issue based on competition among US states suggest that
such competition is essentially zero-sum. Head, Ries and Swenson (1999), based on a model of
location choices by Japanese subsidiaries in the United States, concluded that the provision of
foreign trade zones served to reallocate Japanese plants across states but did not alter the to-
tal number of Japanese investments in the US. Their simulations were based on a conditional
logit model, which in fact already implies the zero-sum prediction. Goolsbee and Maydew
(2000) explored how revisions in profit apportionment rules by US state governments towards
formulae that do not penalize employment creation have affected state-level and aggregate
employment growth. They found that such reforms indeed boosted own-state employment,
but that they reduced aggregate out-of-state employment by almost exactly the same amount.
Chirinko and Wilson (2008) and Wilson (2009) have analyzed the own-state and neighboring
out-of-state effects of US state-level R&D tax credits, concluding that the two effects almost
exactly offset each other.
3 Estimating the rivalness of tax bases
3.1 Conditional logit, Poisson, and nested logit
The three standard location choice models – conditional logit, nested logit and Poisson – imply
starkly different predictions. Take a corporate tax cut in a particular region. Provided that
2Following Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the Poisson approach has also become popular for the estimation of
gravity models of international trade (e.g. Magee, 2008) and investment (e.g. Head and Ries, 2007).
3For a survey of this literature, see Hines (1999).
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this is perceived by investors as making that region more attractive, all three models predict
that the region itself will see an increase in its capital base. The magnitude of the implied
increase, however, differs: it is largest if the world is properly represented by the Poisson
model, smallest if the world conforms with the conditional logit, and somewhere in-between
if the world is nested logit. In a Poisson world, the tax cut will have no impact on investment
elsewhere. It will, however, pull investment away from other regions in the conditional logit
and the nested logit cases. As the total amount of investment is fixed in the conditional logit,
the investment pulled away from the other regions exactly offsets the increase in investment
in the tax-cutting region itself. The nested logit again represents an intermediate case, with
some of the attracted investment being shifted from elsewhere within the data set, implying
that regional corporate tax bases are “rival”; and some investment appearing from outside
that set, implying a “non-rival” component of the tax base (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
The linear connection of the conditional logit and Poisson models through the nested logit
can be quantified in a simple parameter, contained between zero and one, which measures the
rivalness of the tax base (Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart, 2011). If the economy is purely zero-sum,
such that one region’s gain is some other region’s equivalent loss, then the world corresponds
to the conditional logit assumptions and the rivalness parameter is equal to one. Conversely,
if the economy is purely positive-sum, such that one region’s gain is no other region’s loss,
then the world corresponds to the Poisson assumptions and the rivalness parameter is zero.
All intermediate cases are possible as well.
The rivalness parameter is eminently policy relevant and offers a rigorous link to the
theory. Unfortunately, however, it cannot be estimated in cross-section data. After all,
the Guimaraes et al. (2003) equivalence result implies that the models are observationally
equivalent if estimated at a given point in time. In the presence of panel data, however, where
tax burdens and tax bases are recorded across regions for more than one point in time, the
rivalness parameter can in principle be identified. In a pure zero-sum world (i.e. where the
rivalness parameter takes its maximum value of one), a change in tax rates in some regions will
leave the aggregate size of the tax base across all relevant regions unchanged. This aggregate
tax base, however, will grow if the world is positive-sum and some regions cut their tax rates.
Hence, the degree of rivalness across regions can be inferred from changes in the aggregate tax
base relative to a weighted average of the changes in tax burdens across regions. Below, we
derive how the correct weights for this average can be calculated from the nested logit model.
For ease of exposition, we consider location choices of equally sized single-location firms,
and we begin by abstracting from the time dimension. For “firms”, one might equivalently
read “investment projects” or “units of FDI”. Let us denote firms with f = 1, ..., N , and
regions with j = 1, ..., J . The random variable nj represents the count of firms in region
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j, whereas Nj denotes the number of firms actually observed in region j. Analogously, the
random variable n represents the total number of firms, whereas N denotes the observed total
number of firms.
We consider two scenarios. In Case A, determinants of locational attractiveness are purely
region specific, such that they affect all firms symmetrically. Under Case B, we relax this
assumption, and allow locational attractiveness to be region-industry specific.
3.2 Case A: industry-invariant locational determinants
Suppose that firm f ’s profit in region j is determined by the linear model pifj = x
′
jβ + εfj ,
where the K observable characteristics of each region are given by the vector xj , and β is
a vector of coefficients. The parameters β can be estimated by maximum likelihood, using
conditional logit, Poisson or nested logit assumptions. We now present each model in turn.
The conditional logit model is defined by the assumption that the random term εfj is
independent across f and j, and follows an extreme-value type 1 distribution. With these
assumptions, the probability that a given firm f chooses region j rather than any other region
is given by
Pj =
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
, (1)
where
∑
j Pj|f = 1 for all f . Since locational characteristics xj are assumed here to affect all
firms symmetrically, this probability also represents the share of firms that will choose region
j.
The conditional logit model implicitly assumes that the total number of firms n does
not depend on the locational characteristics xj . The expected number of firms in region j,
is therefore given by E(nj) = nPj ; and the expected total number of firms is equal to the
observed total, N , irrespective of regressors and parameters, E(n) =
∑J
j=1E(nj) = n = N .
This shows the “zero sum” aspect of the conditional logit model, which implies allocating an
exogenously fixed number of firms over a set of regions.
The Poisson estimator is based on the assumption that the number of firms nj is inde-
pendently Poisson distributed with region-specific mean
E(nj) = e
α+x′jβ. (2)
Here too, the parameters β can be estimated by maximum likelihood. As originally pointed
out by Guimaraes et al. (2003), the log likelihood functions for the conditional logit and the
Poisson models are identical up to a constant, and maximum likelihood estimation therefore
yields identical parameter estimates βˆ.
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The expected share of firms in region j can be written as
Pj =
E(nj)∑J
i=1E(ni)
=
eα+x
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
α+x′iβ
=
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
, (3)
which is exactly the same expression as (1), for the conditional logit model.
In the Poisson model, new firms are non-rivalrous, in the sense that adjustment to one
regions’s locational characteristics works not through changes in firm numbers among the
J −1 other regions but from changes either in the supply of local entrepreneurship or in firms
attracted from or repelled to somewhere outside the explicitly considered set of J regions.
Using (2), we find that E(n) =
∑J
j=1E(nj) =
∑J
j=1 e
α+x′jβ = eα
∑J
j=1 e
x′jβ. In contrast to
the conditional logit model, the expected total number of firms is now not generally equal
to the observed total number of firms, N , but depends on regressors and parameters.4 The
Poisson model thus implies that a change in a region’s locational attractiveness will affect the
sum of firms active in the J regions.
In the nested logit model (McFadden, 1978), firms make two sequential choices. At the
first stage, they choose between locating in one of the J regions of interest (which could
stand for “domestic” regions) and an outside option j = 0 (which could stand for locating
“abroad” or for remaining inactive). At the second stage, they choose one location among the
J regions. Like in the conditional logit model, firm f ’s profit in region j > 0 is determined
by a linear function of the region-specific characteristics, such that pifj = x
′
jγ + νfj . Profits
associated with the outside option are given by pif0 = δ + νf0, where δ summarizes the
exogenously determined locational attractiveness of the outside option. The stochastic term
νf0 is assumed to follow a generalized extreme value distribution, νf0 and νfj are assumed
to be independent. The correlation correlation across νfj for all j > 0 is assumed to be
non-negative and constant over time. It is written as
(
1− λ2), such that the parameter λ
measures the importance of the domestic nest as a whole relative to the outside option.
The probability that a particular firm f chooses a particular region j > 0 among the J
regions of interest is
Pj =
ex
′
jβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ−1
eδ + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ)λ
= Pj>0 · Pj|j>0,
where β = γ/λ. The choice probabilities Pj can be decomposed into (a) the probability of
choosing any of the J regions, Pj>0 = 1 − P0, and (b) the probability of choosing a specific
4Note that the predicted total number of firms at the estimated coefficients and actual data corresponds to
the observed total of firms in the Poisson model just as it does in the conditional logit model. In symbols,
E(n|αˆ, βˆ) = N .
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Figure 1: Elasticities Implied by Different Models
Notes: CL = conditional logit, NL = nested logit, P = Poisson
region j given that the firm chooses to set up in one of the J regions,
Pj|j>0 =
ex
′
jβ∑J
i=1 e
x′iβ
. (4)
The parameters β can again be estimated by maximum likelihood. The expected total
number of firms active in the J regions is simply given by the share of potential firms that
decide to become active in one of those regions:
E(n) = (n+ n0)
(
∑J
j=1 e
x′jβ)λ
eδ + (
∑J
j=1 e
x′jβ)λ
= (n+ n0)Pj>0. (5)
As in the Poisson model, the expected total number of firms is not generally equal to the
observed total number of firms, N , but depends on the regressors and parameters, including
those for the outside option.5
In order to compare the three models, we define the rivalness parameter ρ = 1 − λP0,
which satisfies 0 ≥ ρ ≥ 1 under the standard nested logit assumption 0 < λ ≤ 1. The
parameter ρ offers a measure of where the data generating process lies between the two polar
cases, conditional logit (ρ = 1) and Poisson (ρ = 0). One may think of ρ as capturing of
the relative importance of the outside option: as ρ → 0, competition among the J regions
becomes unimportant relative to the weight of the outside option. Figure 1 summarizes the
relationship between the three models.
3.3 Case B: industry-specific locational determinants
Suppose now that we observe K characteristics xsj for every industry s and region j. Hence,
we again do not observe firm-specific attributes, but we now allow for attributes to differ
across groups of firms, thought of as industries. We maintain the notation xj for the subset of
5As in the Poisson and conditional logit models, the predicted total number of firms among the J regions
at the estimated coefficients and actual data corresponds to the observed total: E(n|βˆ, δˆ, λˆ) = N .
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locational determinants that are constant across industries. Furthermore, nsj is the number
of firms in industry s and region j.
The grouped conditional logit model is given by the probability that a given firm f of
industry s chooses region j rather than another region:
Pj|f = Pj|s =
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
,
where Pj|s is the probability for a particular firm to choose region j, given that the firm
belongs to industry s, and
∑
j Pj|s = 1.
The grouped Poisson model is given by
E(nsj) = e
αs+x′sjβ,
where αs is an industry-specific constant.
Finally, the grouped nested logit model is given by the probability that a given firm f of
industry s chooses either the outside option j = 0, or a particular domestic region j > 0:
Pj|s =
ex
′
sjβ(
∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ)λ−1
eδs + (
∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ)λ
= Pj>0|s · Pj|j>0·s = (1− P0|s)Pj|j>0·s,
where δs is an industry-year-specific constant. Pj>0|s = 1−P0|s is the probability that a given
industry-s firm chooses any domestic region j > 0, and
Pj|j>0·s =
ex
′
sjβ∑J
i=1 e
x′siβ
(6)
is the probability that such a firm chooses a particular domestic region conditional on not
choosing the outside option.
As in Case A, the three models are observationally equivalent in a cross-section of do-
mestic firm choices and yield identical estimates for the parameter vector β, but the implied
elasticities of the aggregate firm number relative to region-specific attributes are qualitatively
different.
4 Estimation
As the likelihood functions of the conditional logit, the nested logit and the Poisson models
are identical up to a constant term, estimation of any of the three models will yield identical
parameter vectors β in cross-section data. Hence, the three models are observationally equiv-
alent, and the rivalness parameter ρ is not identified (though irrelevant for the estimation of
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β). It is impossible to discriminate between the three models based on a cross-section of data.
If, however, we were able to observe how the total number of firms, N , reacts to changes in
the relevant j-level policy variables, ceteris paribus, we would be able to distinguish between
the three models. Panel data on changes in firm counts or capital stocks could therefore
provide the key to identifying elasticities and to answering the ultimate question of whether
policy competition is zero sum or positive sum.
4.1 Case A
We begin by considering Case A, i.e. by abstracting from the industry dimension. In the
nested logit model, the local linear approximation of the response by the total number of firms
n to a simultaneous (small) change of the explanatory variable xjk in all regions j = 1, 2, ..., J
is given by the total differential:
d logE(n) ∼=
∑
j
∂ logE(n)
∂xjk
dxjk = (1− r)βk
∑
j
Pj|j>0dxjk = (1− r)βkdxk, (7)
where E(n) is the expected total number of firms (see equation 5), d logE(n) is the corre-
sponding log change, Pj is the probability that firms choose region j, xjk is the value of the
explanatory variable k, and dxjk the corresponding change. dxk =
∑
j Pj|j>0dxjk is the aver-
age of changes in xjk weighted by the predicted size of locations j, and r is the time-invariant
estimated counterpart to the rivalness parameter ρ. In the conditional logit model (r = 1), the
aggregate response is d logE(n) = 0, whereas in the Poisson model, it is d logE(n) = βktdxk.
Equation (7) suggests the following estimable relationship using a panel of observations of
several years t:
d log nt = c+ (1− r) · βktdxkt + ut, (8)
where ut are i.i.d. shocks to nt.
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Equation (8) has an intuitive meaning beyond the specific derivation we present: the
relevant variable that explains aggregate changes in response to simultaneous changes in all
regions is a weighted average of the regional changes. The weights are the number of firms
in the regions. However, instead of taking the realized number of firms (which would be
endogenous by construction) our analysis shows that one should take the expected number.
Equation (8) can be estimated by the following two-step procedure:
First Step
• For all t, estimate βˆt with maximum likelihood (conditional logit or Poisson).
6Additive i.i.d. shocks imply that lognt follows an integrated process of order 1.
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• For all t and j, predict the choice probabilities Pˆjt|j>0·t = ex
′
jtβˆt/
∑J
i=1 e
x′itβˆt .
• For all t, compute β̂tdxkt = βˆt
∑
j Pˆjt|j>0·tdxjkt.
Second Step
• Regress d log nt on β̂tdxkt.
Inference at the second step will have to take account of the fact that the independent
variable is estimated. This can be done by bootstrapping both steps.
Note that the first step of this procedure amounts to a theory-based method of weighting
region-level changes in the policy variable of interest xk, yielding a measure of the relevant
aggregate change in that variable. Our approach therefore offers an alternative to the atheo-
retical weighting schemes used in previous research, typically based on distance (e.g. Chirinko
and Wilson, 2008; Wilson, 2009), or on region size (e.g. Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000).
In general, net growth of the firm stock will depend on many factors other than the policy
variable of interest xk, such as the business cycle, changes in other domestic policy variables,
changes in the international environment or a general time trend. To ignore such additional
determinants would likely bias the estimate of r. Consistent estimation of the non-rivalness
parameter r therefore boils down to the standard problem of identifying the effect of a change
in ̂ˆβtdxkt. This is either achieved by properly controlling for all potential determinants of the
dependent variable, or by finding instrument for ̂ˆβtdxkt.
4.2 Case B
The use of panel data with an industry dimension in addition to the time and regional dimen-
sions could offer further scope for the identification of r. If the dependent variable is industry
specific, the estimation equation becomes:
d log nst = cs + (1− rs) · βtdxkt + ust, (9)
where the estimated rivalness parameter rs and the constant cs can be industry specific, thus
controlling for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics. Furthermore, if there were
some omitted variable that biases the estimation of all rs, the ranking of rs across industries
could still offer unbiased estimates of the relative proximity of individual industries to the
conditional logit (zero-sum) or Poisson (positive sum) frameworks.
In case the independent variable dxsjkt and/or the location choice parameters βs are
industry specific, the equation becomes
d log nst = cs + ct + (1− rs) · βstdxskt + ust, (10)
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such that we are in addition able to introduce time fixed effects ct which control for exogenous
growth factors common to all industries.
5 Empirical estimates
5.1 Data
We apply our two-stage panel estimation method to explore the impact of state-level corporate
taxation on U.S. inward FDI over the 1977-2006 time period. The dependent variable is defined
as annual changes in state-level FDI by sector or by origin country. This setup corresponds
to Case B, where we estimate multiple rivalness parameters. FDI is measured alternatively as
employment, physical capital stock or number of plants controlled by non-US multinational
firms (see Table 1 for summary statistics). Our main explanatory variable is the user cost of
capital, as computed for each state and year by Chirinko and Wilson (2008). This variable
represents the best available measure of corporate tax burdens, as it captures differences in tax
schedules and exemptions and it is adjusted for the extent to which state taxes are deductible
from federal taxes and vice-versa. See Chirinko and Wilson (2008) for details.
In addition, we control for the following state-year covariates in the second-step regressions:
state government construction spending, median wages, share of working-age population with
a third-level degree, median rent for a 2-3 bedroom house, the log of market potential (in-
versely distance weighted state GDPs), and the log of state population. Due to breaks in the
construction of the FDI data series, we furthermore include dummy variables for the years
1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002.
5.2 Results
In Table 2, we show estimates of the estimated rivalness parameter r̂ across the six broad
industries distinguished in the data. In the pure positive-sum world implied by a Poisson
model, the tax base is non-rival and r̂ would thus be equal to zero. Conversely, in a zero-sum
world as assumed by the conditional logit, r̂ would be equal to one. For this reason, we report
tests of the hypotheses r = 0 and r = 1 in the last two columns of Table 2.
An estimated value of r outside the interval (0, 1) would reject our model. While we obtain
some point estimates outside that range, we can reject the hypothesis that r ∈ (0, 1) for none
of them.
At the standard significance threshold of 5 percent, we cannot reject the hypothesis r = 1
either in any of our estimation runs. This means that our data do not reject the zero-sum
assumption.
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In four estimation runs, however, we can reject the hypothesis r = 0 at the 5-percent
level. Hence, the data are favorable to the hypothesis that inward FDI is a rival resource
for US states – one state’s gain is, to some extent, the other states’ loss. In no case do our
estimations suggest that FDI could be perfectly rival (i.e. r = 1).
When looking at differences across sectors, we find the estimated rivalness parameters to
be most precisely measured and relatively high in the manufacturing sector. Taken at face
value, this implies that foreign investors in manufacturing ignore state-level tax burdens when
deciding on how much to invest in the United States but consider the tax burden when picking
a state within the US.
Table 3 reports results based on the differentiation of FDI flows across origin countries.
In this case, FDI is measured by counts of foreign-controlled establishments. Again, we never
reject the model, i.e. the hypothesis that r ∈ (0, 1). Another parallel is that we never reject
perfect rivalness (r = 1), but in once case we reject perfect non-rivalness (r = 0). Again, the
data are more supportive of the rivalness assumption.
Considerable care is evidently warranted in the interpretation of these results. The stan-
dard errors are relatively large. In several cases, the estimated rivalness parameters even lie
outside the admissible (0, 1) range (although not statistically significantly so). Nonetheless,
our results are rather more favorable to the zero-sum hypothesis than to the pure positive-sum
hypothesis.
6 Concluding Discussion
Economists and policy makers devote considerable effort to estimating the impact of regional
initiatives aimed at attracting firms or lucrative tax payers. For example, there is now solid
empirical evidence for the entirely unsurprising result that low corporate taxes attract firms
and employment. A closely related and equally important question is much less frequently
asked: where do firms and jobs attracted by fiscal inducements come from? If one region’s
gain is just another region’s loss, then competition among regions is a zero-sum game over
a “cake” of fixed size. Conversely, if one region’s gain does not come at the expense of any
other region, then competition is positive-sum: the size of the total “cake” grows if one region
enhances its attractiveness.
We have pointed out that the two standard models for estimating the determinants of firms’
location choices although often used interchangeably are in fact fundamentally different. The
conditional logit model implies a pure zero-sum world, while the Poisson model implies a pure
positive-sum world. This distinction can be important for interpreting the size of estimated
policy effects, particularly when considering policy actions by large regions. More importantly,
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the distinction can be used as a tool to estimate the degree to which the object over which
regions compete - be it firms, portfolio capital, wealthy individuals, or whatever - is “rival”.
In other words, we can estimate how close a certain set of regions is to a zero-sum economy
or, equivalently, to a positive-sum economy.
Applying our new estimation tool to data on US states, we conclude that in terms of their
effect on inward FDI, the effect of tax differentials within the United States conforms more
closely with the zero-sum view than with the positive-sum view. This implies that state-level
corporate taxes affect only the distribution of FDI across US states but possibly not the total
amount of FDI into the country as a whole. Inward FDI appears to be a rival resource.
Our empirical analysis is still somewhat rudimentary, given the relatively small sample size
and the difficulty of controlling for all possible covariates (such as non-tax policies targeted
at foreign investors). This exercise should therefore first and foremost highlight the relevance
of the question on the aggregate effects of decentralized economic policy making in federal
systems.
We should finally note that even if we could establish conclusively that certain types of
competitive regional policies are zero-sum or positive-sum, we thereby still would not have
the answer to the questions whether such competitive policy making is desirable or not. Tax
competition can potentially be welfare improving even if it is zero-sum, that is even if the size
of the total tax base is given. This would in particular be the case if regional governments were
“Leviathans” that would overtax their citizens if they were not held in check by the pressures of
tax competition (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). Conversely, positive-sum competition need
not be an unequivocal blessing. If low regional taxes stimulate more local entrepreneurship or
hiring, then that is most likely welfare enhancing. If, however, those attractive policies were
to pull resources not from other regions of the same country but from other countries, then
what would appear as positive-sum competition within a given country could in fact amount
to zero-sum competition at the international level.
In sum, it strikes us as important (as well as scientifically challenging) to ask not only
“how much economic activity will my regional policy manage to attract?”, but also “where
will that additional activity come from?” The desirability of political decentralization may
depend on the answer to that second question.
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 Figure 1: Elasticities Implied by Different Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notation: CL = conditional logit, NL = nested logit , P = Poisson 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. 
FDI (employment) 20.06 49.44 0.00 749.40 
FDI (capital stock) 2,775.36 7,919.27 0.00 121,040.00 
FDI (plants) 121.83 257.83 0.00 4048 
User cost of capital 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.36 
State government 
construction spending 0.80 0.95 0.03 8.82 
Median wage 507.40 54.53 387.30 818.31 
Share of working-age 
pop. with 3rd-level degree 0.24 0.06 0.09 0.52 
Median house rent 543.91 165.76 301.37 1497.20 
Market potential (in logs) 9.52 0.66 7.09 11.91 
Population (in logs) 14.96 1.01 12.71 17.41 
Annual state-level data from 1977 to 2006. FDI data from Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), tax data and controls from Chirinko and Wilson (2008). 
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 Table 2: Estimated Rivalness of US Inward FDI by Industry 
 
  Rivalness Parameter   Tests (p-value) 
  Estimated r stand. error   H0: r = 1 H0: r = 0 
FDI in terms of employment 
All industries 1.01 0.44  0.981 0.036 
Finance & Insurance 0.39 0.97  0.538 0.695 
Manufacturing 0.86 0.21  0.514 0.001 
Other Industries -0.01 0.76  0.208 0.992 
Real Estate 0.23 0.42  0.086 0.593 
Retail Trade 0.68 0.53  0.554 0.221 
Wholesale Trade 0.78 0.17  0.203 0.000 
FDI in terms of physical capital 
All industries 0.28 0.45  0.133 0.551 
Finance & Insurance 0.58 0.59  0.483 0.342 
Manufacturing 0.93 0.27  0.792 0.004 
Other Industries -1.20 1.68  0.211 0.485 
Real Estate 0.81 0.39  0.626 0.056 
Retail Trade 0.99 1.27  0.995 0.448 
Wholesale Trade -6.92 4.19   0.080 0.121 
Results from a two-step estimation procedure using panel data from 1977 to 2006. The 
rivalness parameter r measures whether FDI gains from a tax reduction in one state equal the 
total FDI losses of the other states (r = 1), reduce FDI in other states to a limited extent  (0 < 
r < 1), or do not affect the amount of FDI flowing to other states at all (r = 0). Coefficients 
on control variables not shown. FDI data from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), tax 
data and controls from Chirinko and Wilson (2008). 
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 Table 3: Estimated Rivalness of US Inward FDI by Country of Origin 
 
  Rivalness Parameter   Tests (p-value) 
  Estimated r stand. error   H0: r = 1 H0: r = 0 
FDI in terms of establishment numbers 
All origins 1.04 0.50  0.936 0.055 
Canada 1.06 0.55  0.914 0.074 
Latin America 0.73 0.29  0.381 0.026 
Japan 0.72 0.23  0.122 0.019 
Middle East 0.28 0.67  0.302 0.683 
France 1.92 2.23  0.686 0.404 
Germany 0.54 0.79  0.568 0.502 
United Kingdom -0.04 2.08  0.627 0.987 
Results from a two-step estimation procedure using panel data from 1977 to 2006. The 
rivalness parameter r measures whether FDI gains from a tax reduction in one state equal the 
total FDI losses of the other states (r = 1), reduce FDI in other states to a limited extent  (0 < 
r < 1), or do not affect the amount of FDI flowing to other states at all (r = 0). Coefficients 
on control variables not shown. FDI data from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), tax 
data and controls from Chirinko and Wilson (2008). 
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